

Why was the Qing Dynasty Able to Survive the Taiping Rebellion but not the Events of 1911?

Introduction

During the time of the late Qing dynasty in China two prominent events happened, the Taiping Rebellion and the (Xinhai) Revolution of 1911, both of which have taken a significant part in leading the dynasty to its eventual downfall. However, the extent to which both event have contributed to end the imperial system and modernise China is still debated by scholars¹. But regardless of the differing viewpoints, both movement was a response to underlying social, economic and ideological changes in China caused by the Qing court's financial and administrative weakness and by foreign encroachment, which forced the country out of its self-contained state "into a world of competing nation-states and imperialist intrusions"².

In this essay, it will be explored how the Qing government was able to endure and defeat the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, but not the Xinhai Revolution by examining the political and socio-economic circumstances, the ideologies present, the events that took place during the movements and the counteractions carried out by the Manchu leadership. Through the observation of such aspects it could be inferred that the decay in central power, exacerbated by the presence of intruding foreign nations, was caused by the development of underlying changes in China that gradually formed a desire for the modernisation of the country and the replacement of the Manchu leadership. The Taiping Rebellion failed due to the fact that such changes in the mid-nineteenth century mainly affected the lower classes negatively, prompting them to act against the central rule and in response to the changes, while the politically influential Chinese gentry was interested in nourishing the changes as it was benefitting from the affliction of the peasantry. Furthermore, the elite was educated in the old examination system, thus they retained the traditional, Confucian thinking with which the loyalty to the government was kept. The court had to sacrifice a large portion of its power in favour of the elite and also of the British in order to survive the uprising.

However, following the rebellion, changes leading toward the modernisation of China gathered speed which had even reached the upper classes and shifted their mindset in the direction of supporting political reforms and a complete regime change. Several groups formed from the elite advocating for different types of reforms and aligned their efforts in 1911 to successfully put an end to the imperial system and bring the republican era of China³.

The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864)

The circumstances

For the purpose of understanding the reasons behind the start of the rebellion and why it was unsuccessful, the historical context and the socio-economic background that preceded the uprising should be examined. Until the end of the 18th century before the dynasty embraced a vast amount of territories in inner China, the Qing court had a "highly centralized state power and effective administrative military control"⁴. However, following such enormous expansions the Qing began to struggle with resource shortfalls as "the military expeditions and logistic support required to maintain a

long-distance garrison in the extended territories [that] gradually imposed a heavy burden on the state treasury”⁵. From the last decade of the 18th century internal problems appeared such as the decline of the state’s revenue due to the weak fiscal system of the Qing that marks the beginning of the erosion of the central government's power⁶.

The system was inherited from the Ming dynasty and controlled by the central government's Board of Revenue. The Board “assigned a definite quota for remission by the authorities of the respective provinces. In turn, the provincial authorities assigned to each district, or *hsien*, within their jurisdiction [had] a sum for remittance to themselves”⁷. The Qing court “only prescribed the maximum to be accounted for by the local authorities. It in no way prevented the provincial and *hsien* officials from collecting more than their quota. Such surpluses were in practice of no concern to the central government”⁸. Furthermore, the “quotas for land tax collection were gradually fixed which remained unchanged from year to year”⁹, thus the budget of the government became unresponsive to the growing size of the country which resulted in the lack of resources. Although under such conditions the provincial officials were responsible to tackle the financial issues in their districts on their own, they were also able to utilize the static quota to their advantage by collecting more tax and gaining surplus¹⁰.

With regards of the expenditure, the revenues collected were seldom received or disbursed in Beijing and were held by the local authorities or were sent straight from one province to another, therefore it was not centralized. Although, the provincial officials had to report about their expenditures that were later checked by a department of the Board of Revenue, the central authority was still unable to completely oversee the spendings within each province¹¹. As a result of the Qing court’s rigid and unmodified fiscal system the provincial authorities and governor-generals received more financial autonomy which extended their influence over their own territories and decreased the power of the central government.

Perhaps it was the peasants who suffered the most due to the tax collection of the provincial officials. They were the ones who had to shoulder most of the tax burdens due to the fact that while collecting their quota, the magistrates provided privileges such as exemption from the corresponding tax to the landed local gentry “by reason of class identity with and diffidence to [them]”¹² and because “these local dominants [helped] the magistrate collect the land tax”¹³. Under the pressure of increasing taxes peasants tended to sell their lands to the gentry and became tenants, consequently concentrating the cultivable land into the hands of few and strengthening the authority of the landed gentry who already gained influence by collaborating with the magistrates. When this phenomenon reached its peak and the peasantry was unable to endure the payment of further taxes, the petty gentry, who were less influential, were the ones who experienced an increase in their taxation. Hence, a conflict formed in which the petty gentry and the peasantry stood against the tax collecting provincial and local gentry officials representing the Qing court, which was a common process in Chinese history¹⁴.

The dissatisfaction of the masses was also fuelled by the Manchu government’s loosening grip over its civil administration¹⁵. As the provincial and local authorities “pocketed funds intended for the maintenance of rivers and dams”¹⁶, large amounts of crops were destroyed by floods which resulted in widespread famine that was even exacerbated by the fact that China faced an explosion in population while the amount of cultivable land did not increase¹⁷. Due to such tensions the appearance of an uprising like the Taiping Rebellion was predictable with discontent peasants enticed to it due to its unique ideology and socio-economic ambitions.

The situation in China was further disorientated by foreign encroachment, mainly the appearance of the British in the country. The opium trade with the British had not only transformed many into addicts, but it led to vast amounts of silver flow out of the country upsetting the silver/copper exchange ratio. This

brought further misery to the peasantry as they had to pay their taxes in silver, however, they only possessed copper coins which devalued as the silver reserves of the country decreased¹⁸. Following the First Opium War (1839-1842) with Great Britain, the Manchu government lost its prestige both externally and internally¹⁹ and had to make concessions to the British through the humiliating Treaty of Nanjing which opened up treaty ports for the European power through which it was able to conduct trade. As a consequence, old “economic patterns were disrupted, as the foreign trading monopoly was no longer exclusively associated with Guangdong province”²⁰, thanks to which “a quick and significant shift of trade from [Guangdong] to the more northerly ports”²¹ happened, “thousands of people were thrown out of work and trade was diverted away from the traditional routes”²². In these circumstances people had either formed secret societies against the Manchus or pirate and bandit gangs for the purpose of their survival, many of which were created in Southern China where the foreign economic presence was most impactful²³. Among the many groups the so-called God Worshipers’ Society emerged which later evolved into the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom to which those also joined who lost their livelihoods caused by the economic shift from the Southern regions²⁴.

The ideologies

The Taiping Rebellion was different from other movements at the time because of its ideological context in which it was born and its goal of not simply replacing the imperial government, but its intention to bring change into the economic and social structure of the country²⁵. The ideas of the movement came in response to the economic changes, originating from the weak fiscal system and foreign presence, and to the social changes in which the gentry gained dominance in the country.

Beginning with the rebellion’s ideology, it was created by the founder of the movement, Hong Xiuquan²⁶, who developed “his own version of Old Testament Protestant Christianity”²⁷ in which “the Manchu regime became identified...with demonic forces that had to be destroyed”²⁸. For this purpose, the God Worshipers’ Society was created and additionally he started organizing his own military which led to the establishment of the Taiping Tianguo after some confrontations with authorities.

Taiping Christianity also incorporated elements from Confucianism, despite the Taipings early hostility towards it, since the “peasant Chinese who so largely made up the forces of Hong Xiuquan were already deeply imbued with ethical and religious traditions rooted in the past,... [therefore a] compromise with many of [Confucianism’s] customs and values had to [be] made”²⁹ in order to maintain the loyalty of the peasantry to the movement.

With the creation of his faith that “starkly challenged the Confucian conception of the state as a condominium of the emperor and the literati-bureaucracy”³⁰ while still including elements of Chinese Confucian tradition, Hong was able to gather a large group of people who joined his cause due to their loss of trust towards the Manchu leadership. These converts also supported the Taipings at first for their social and economic aspirations. They envisioned a system in which there were no landed gentry, only a huge brother- and sisterhood divided into districts where land was distributed in proportion to the sizes of families and everybody could enjoy the outcome of the community’s labour³¹ which was appealing to the masses, but not to the gentry elite as it would have stripped away their political power.

The uprising was “too bizarre and irrational to win over [the] Chinese literati, who were normally essential to setting up a new administration”³². As the Taiping expansion reached Central China, they had to face “a dominant...gentry class that had exercised effective control over the rural areas [and] had long been a stronghold of traditional Chinese culture and religious orthodoxy”³³, since they were educated in the traditional examination system that “sanctioned Confucian learning”³⁴. “The

Taiping...posed an immediate and real threat to the local gentry class... [who] feared that their cultural heritage and political influence would be disrupted if the Taipings were not stopped”³⁵.

As the gentry opposed the new ideology of the Taipings and supported the social and economic developments which strengthened their political and economic status and fuelled the outbreak of the rebellion and the decay of the central government, the Qing leadership found itself an ally to whom it even granted military power later on in order to combat the rebels.

The events

In the beginning of the rebellion, the Taipings were successful in their endeavour and had even occupied Nanjing in 1853 which became the capital of the Heavenly Kingdom. However, following the capture of Nanjing, problems started to arise that weakened the rebellion. There were numerous internal issues within the political leadership³⁶ that not only disrupted the administration of the Kingdom, but also portrayed leaders as hypocritical to their followers.

Furthermore, it was a more severe problem that the Taiping army only took over cities and disregarded the countryside where “the local landed elite remained in place”³⁷ that, after “the Qing dynasty was not able to suppress the rebellion with its regular military forces”³⁸ was ordered to organize local militias which bestowed more power onto the scholar-gentry class. These regional forces, which proved to be effective against the Taipings, were under the authority of those provincial gentry governor-generals³⁹ who were loyal to the central government and had the same traditional Confucian values⁴⁰ as the court. Furthermore, the Manchu leadership had introduced a new form of taxation, named *likin*, on commerce and the handicraft industry which was also under provincial and local control and lifted the revenue burden from the shoulders of the peasants. In this way, the court was able to gain the support of the peasantry who, with the passing of time, felt alienated from the Taipings distributive system⁴¹, thus further weakening the Heavenly Kingdom.

The strengthening of the provincial authorities was part of the dual policy of the so-called Qing Restoration of the 1860s, initiated by the Empress Dowager Cixi. Next to the policy of increasing gentry influence, the government set itself to “accept the treaty system in order to appease the foreign powers”⁴² and receive their support. The decision was made because China had further conflicts with the West “between 1856 and 1858 and again during 1860 [which] led to the sack of Beijing”⁴³ and the creation of the Treaty of Tianjin that provided even more concessions to foreign powers. Although the treaty made the government weaker than before, with the policy of the restoration the court was able to gain the military assistance of the British. In Britain’s main interest was to uphold the treaties to conduct advantageous trade and the Qing presented itself as obedient and exploitable, while the Taipings showed no sign of cooperation⁴⁴. Thus, the British shifted “from a policy of imperfect neutrality to one of decidedly limited intervention. There was no attempt to deploy large British forces in an extensive campaign”⁴⁵, but they provided small scale military support, equipment and training. It could be seen that as “the Qing court became too weak to contain the thrust of the Taiping, [with the introduction of its restoration efforts], it was compelled to rely entirely upon local gentry militia forces and the Western powers”⁴⁶. Through its restoration efforts, including the militarization of the countryside, the introduction of *likin* and the subordination of itself under foreign nations, the Manchu government was able to survive the Taiping Rebellion, however, only with seriously enfeebling its own central power which made it impossible for the Qing to re-establish its former authority. The power redistribution accelerated the underlying changes in the country which reached the upper classes and brought them to the forefront of the struggle for political reforms.

The Revolution of 1911

The ideologies

Approaching the Revolution of 1911 there were three stages that led to the ideological shift of the Chinese elite from the traditional Confucian to the reformist mindset. Firstly, after the Qing Restoration of the 1860s, the “self-strengthening” movement began during which “leading personalities, both Manchu and Chinese, tried to adapt Western devices and institutions”⁴⁷ as they realised that China should revitalize herself following its defeat from Western powers. Many reformers of the time advocated for the adaptation of foreign tools, but not values, therefore preserving the Confucian order while having an improved military with Western equipment.

However, due to further lost wars against foreign powers, such as modernised Japan in 1895 which was once the tributary state of China, the self-strengthening turned out to be insufficient. Some members from the Chinese elite, who could not bear the humiliating defeats, came to the conclusion that not only military, but structural reforms are also necessary⁴⁸. As a second stage, during these times two prominent figures appeared, Kang Youwei and his student Liang Qichao who initiated their reform programme in 1898 named the “Hundred Days Reform” that intended to renew the education and examination system, agriculture and commerce of the country, however, it was impeded by the Manchu leadership as they had seen the changes as threats against the old order⁴⁹.

The point where even the central government deemed change necessary was after the Boxer Rebellion, a revolt, backed by the Empress Dowager, against foreigners in the country that ended again with a humiliating defeat against eight foreign nations. The court’s prestige was damaged, more privileges had to be provided for the foreign powers and an enormous sum of indemnity had to be paid. With these blunders of the Manchus and, furthermore, with the proliferation of Western ideas⁵⁰, as a third stage, several groups appeared that desired political reforms and constitutionalism instead of the Confucianist order⁵¹.

Besides the mindset of wishing the replacement of the imperial system, the thought of nationalism⁵² also spread among the Chinese “fueled by an intense fear that imperialism would carve up China or even exterminate the Chinese race”⁵³, which later deemed the Manchus also as oppressing foreigners. The development of these ideological changes was one of the important factors of the success of the 1911 Revolution as it created a reformist Chinese elite which was lacking during the Taiping Rebellion.

The circumstances

Since the Qing court further struggled with systemic problems worsened by the outcomes of the Qing restoration due to which its central power was severely weakened, new social changes took place as many groups formed for the purpose of reforming the political structure of the country. These groups believed that the “inadequacies of the old regime in administration and finance were deeply rooted in Chinese custom, political values, and social structure”⁵⁴, thus reforms were indispensable. However, these groups differed in their ideas on how they envisioned to substitute the imperial rule.

First, there were the revolutionary groups⁵⁵ such as the Tongmenghui founded by Sun Yat-sen the most prominent figure among the revolutionaries⁵⁶. He set the ideological basis for his movement with the Three People’s Principles in which he advocated for a nationalist revolution which could bring a new

economic system and republicanism to China⁵⁷. The members of the revolutionaries were mainly overseas Chinese and students who, following the abolishment of the old examinations in 1905 part of the court's reform effort after the Boxer Rebellion, were "buffeted by discordant fragments of Chinese and Western thought"⁵⁸. Without the old examinations the "production of the degree-holding elite, the gentry class [stopped and the] old order was losing its intellectual foundation and therefore its philosophical cohesion"⁵⁹.

Thanks to academic literature which shifts its focus from the revolutionaries, more attention could be placed upon the urban reformist elite and the New Army⁶⁰. The reformist elite evolved from the urban gentry class who were the successors of the landed gentry that once militarized the countryside and fought against the Taipings and who moved into urban areas and participated in the public sphere⁶¹. These elites were the members of the local self-governments, provincial assemblies and chamber of commerce that were also established during the Manchus' reform efforts, and gained significant political influence⁶². They advocated for the creation of a Japanese-style constitutional monarchy since it would have provided more political control to the elite and its efficacy was proven during the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-5)⁶³. Although, the Qing was "unfolding its own plans for constitutional government [too, it] refused to tolerate efforts to hasten or alter them"⁶⁴, therefore negotiations with the court regarding a quicker transition was tough for the reformist elite due to which many had "lost faith in a peaceful transition to democracy and a few even began to think of revolution"⁶⁵.

The last significant stakeholder in the 1911 revolution was the New Army which was established following the First Sino-Japanese war and was under the control of the provincial governor-generals such as Yuan Shikai. The army "drew more of its manpower from the upper class...educated men formed a markedly higher proportion of the new armies than they had of old"⁶⁶ as it "gave military men a "modern" prestige"⁶⁷. It played an important role because many of the revolutionaries⁶⁸ were able to infiltrate the army and spread propaganda among New Army soldiers who later backed the revolutionary efforts in 1911. These groups that formed due to the underlying social changes in China, proceeding toward 1911 had an increasing potential to overthrow the dynasty, however, they still had to synchronize their interests.

The revolutionaries had already staged ten failed uprisings before 1911 as they lacked cooperation with other social groups⁶⁹. The event that finally brought the different factions together in an effort against the Qing came in 1911 when Beijing arrived at an insoluble dilemma. As Michael Gasster described it:

In brief, the Ch'ing came to see that its reforms were going out of control - the more it reformed the less authority it had, but the less it reformed the less legitimacy it could claim. It tried to stop the trend selectively at first, refusing some demands in 1910 but compromising on others. In 1911 it decided that entirely new initiatives were required, which sealed its doom⁷⁰.

The initiatives were the proclamation of a new cabinet dominated by Manchu officials and the nationalization of railways built with foreign loans. Many disapproved the initiatives as they were "suspicious of the effort to strengthen central government at the expense of local and provincial interests"⁷¹. The most enraged group from all was the urban reformist elite who had invested in private railroad companies and would have been reimbursed with government bonds after the nationalization. Widespread protests began against the Qing which were:

not so much against the loans themselves as the manner in which the loan agreements were concluded. To many assemblymen, for example, the deeper issue was that they had not been consulted....What all the Ch'ing initiatives had in common was arbitrariness. The 1911 loan was not the first foreign loan the Ch'ing had concluded, but it came at a time when the anti-Ch'ing factions had had quite enough of government unaccountability⁷².

With the underlying changes and high tensions between the elite and the government in China there was only need for a catalyst to start off the revolution.

The events

The catalyst came when accidentally a bomb exploded at the revolutionaries' headquarters where a membership list was found by the authorities raiding the building⁷³. The revolutionaries among the New Army rapidly acted and as John Fairbank and Merle Goldman described it:

On October 10, 1911, a revolt at Wuchang touched off the defection of most provinces, which declared their independence of the Qing regime. The professional agitators of the Revolutionary League, who had made Sun Yatsen their leader in Tokyo in 1905, set up the Chinese Republic on January 1, 1912, at Nanjing, with Sun as provisional president.

There was general agreement that China must have a parliament to represent the provinces, that unity was necessary to forestall foreign intervention, and that the reform-minded Yuan Shikai, Li Hongzhang's successor and chief trainer of China's New Army, was the one man with the capacity to head a government. Through a noteworthy series of compromises, China avoided both prolonged civil war and peasant risings as well as foreign intervention⁷⁴. The Qing emperor abdicated, Dr. Sun resigned, and in March 1912 Yuan became president⁷⁵.

Although, Yuan later became a dictator who sought to establish a new dynasty which failed due to his death, the revolution was still a significant event as it put an end to numerous centuries of imperial rule. The Revolution of 1911 succeeded because the desire for political reforms formed by social, economic and ideological changes, unlike during the Taiping Rebellion, had reached the upper classes whose thinking gradually lost its traditional characteristics, ensuing in a reformist mindset with which these groups, all aligning their interests against the Qing, were capable of bringing their ambitions to fruition.

Conclusion

Having examined the socio-economic background and political environment, the prevailing ideologies present and the events that happened in the course of both movements, conclusions could be made why the actions of 1911 brought the fall of the Qing dynasty while the Taiping Rebellion did not.

Due to the development of underlying social, economic and ideological changes in China, caused by the Qing court's inadequate and static financial system, its weakening administrative grip over the country and foreign imperialism, the Manchu government had to face the erosion of its central power.

During the Taiping Rebellion the ongoing changes financially benefited the gentry and strengthened their political influence. Furthermore, they remained loyal to the Confucian traditions and values, thus they opposed the Taiping rebels' endeavour to bring new ideologies and socio-economic structures to the country. With the start of the Qing restoration which handed military power to the dominant gentry and enlisted the support of the British, parallel to the steadily developing disarray within the Taiping leadership, the rebellion was easily obliterated.

In contrast, as the Qing still struggled with their systemic issues, aggravated by their restoration efforts, further changes came, such as the spread of Western ideas and the formation of several politically active social groups within the Chinese elite, which created a desire for political reforms. They wished to replace the imperial system because the Manchu court appeared more and more inadequate and

incompetent in leading the country and against foreign intruders. Moreover, the government was opposed by the elite because it sought to re-establish its central power through its own modernising efforts, which were perceived as too slow and arbitrary. Under these conditions as the numerous social groups with their differing political programmes aligned their mutual interests against the Qing in 1911 the dynasty's fate was sealed.

Notes

¹ Joseph W. Esherick, "1911: A Review," *Modern China* 2, no. 2 (1976): 163-164, accessed June 13, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/188973>; Frederick Wakeman, "Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 36, no. 2 (1977), accessed May 27, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2053720>. Some perceive the Taiping Rebellion more than just a simple uprising. They claim it to be a revolution due to its attempt to establish a new political, social and economic structure and also a new religious ideological system. Others only agree on the fact that the suppression of the rebellion had revolutionary consequences. In regards of the 1911 revolution some, such as Ichiko Chuzo, cited by Esherick, deem it as a mere "dynastic revolution ... [with] no great economic and social [change that] can be detected between the periods before and after the Revolution", while others, such as Mary Wright, argue that the revolution marked "a new era, indeed ... a new world".

² Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 68.

³ John K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China*, 2nd enl. ed. (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Michael Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement," in *The Cambridge history of China*, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); John S. Gregory, "British Intervention Against the Taiping Rebellion," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 19, no. 1 (1959), accessed May 27, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2943446>; Jieli Li and Jeili Li, "Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion," *Michigan Sociological Review* 12, (1998), accessed May 21, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40969021>; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; Eileen H. Tamura, et al., *China*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997); James T. K. Wu, "The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System," *Pacific Historical Review* 19, no. 3 (1950), accessed May 21, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3635591>.

⁴ Li and Li, "Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion," 34; Gang Zhao, "Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century," *Modern China* 32, no. 1 (2006), accessed May 25, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20062627>.

⁵ Li and Li, "Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion," 34.

⁶ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Li and Li, "Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion."; Wu, "The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System."

⁷ Wu, "The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System," 265.

⁸ *Ibid*, 267.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; Wu, "The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System."

¹¹ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Wu, "The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System."

¹² Wu, "The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System," 268.

¹³ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 71. The *hsien* magistrates also hired local low-status clerks as tax collectors who also profited from the surpluses collected from the taxes.

¹⁴ Tamura, et al., *China*; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; Wu, “The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System.”

¹⁵ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*.

¹⁶ Wu, “The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System,” 269.

¹⁷ Tamura, et al., *China*; Wu, “The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System.”

¹⁸ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Tamura, et al., *China*; Wu, “The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System.”

¹⁹ Li and Li, “Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion.”

²⁰ *Ibid*, 36.

²¹ Wu, “The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System,” 271.

²² Li and Li, “Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion,” 36.

²³ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Tamura, et al., *China*; Wakeman, “Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History.”

²⁴ William T. de Bary and Richard Lufrano, ed., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), E-book edition.

²⁵ Wakeman, “Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History.”

²⁶ De Bary and Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*; Tamura, et al., *China*, 128. Hong Xiuquan was the “son of a peasant family belonging to the Hakka minority group” and “a schoolteacher from southern China who had repeatedly failed the civil service examinations”, thus he was never able to become part of the Chinese literati.

²⁷ De Bary and Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*; Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 207. Following one of his failed examinations he suffered a nervous collapse and during his illness he had a vision from which, and through reading religious Christian texts, he developed his Christian ideology. He preached for the establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth where the one and only God, the Heavenly Father could be worshipped.

²⁸ De Bary and Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*.

²⁹ *Ibid*.

³⁰ Wakeman, “Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History,” 220.

³¹ De Bary and Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*; Wu, “The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System.”

³² Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 207.

³³ Li and Li, “Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion,” 39.

³⁴ Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 72.

³⁵ Li and Li, “Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion,” 39.

³⁶ De Bary and Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*; Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 210. The Taiping kings subordinate of Hong, who were “inept in economics, politics, and overall planning”, started to have rivalries and conflicts among themselves. Moreover, even the Heavenly King (Hong Xiuquan) had violated some of his own teachings as he immersed himself into sinful pleasures which were prohibited by the Book of Heavenly Commandments, losing legitimacy as a result.

³⁷ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 210.

³⁸ Tamura, et al., *China*, 129.

³⁹ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 217. Such governor-generals were Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang who played a prominent role in the modernisation process of China during the self-strengthening period which followed the Taiping Rebellion.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 212. The success of the local militias against the Taiping lied in the manifestation of the Confucian order within the organization of the military forces which resulted in the creation of a well-disciplined and strong army. The militias were networks of “leaders and followers personally beholden to one another and capable of mutual support and devotion in warfare. It was a military application of the reciprocal responsibilities according to status that animated the family system”.

⁴¹ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Tamura, et al., *China*; Wakeman, “Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History.”; Wu, “The Impact of the Taiping Rebellion upon the Manchu Fiscal System.”

⁴² Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 212.

⁴³ Li and Li, “Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion,” 38.

⁴⁴ Gregory, “British Intervention Against the Taiping Rebellion.”

⁴⁵ Ibid, 16.

⁴⁶ Li and Li, “Geopolitical Dynamics of State Change: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Civil War and the Chinese Taiping Rebellion,” 41.

⁴⁷ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 217.

⁴⁸ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Gasster, “The republican revolutionary movement.”; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; Tamura, et al., *China*.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Western ideas spread through the treaty ports where Chinese were in close contact with foreigners and also through Christian missionaries in the country. Moreover, many overseas Chinese and later, during the reforms of the central government, many Chinese student became acquainted with foreign thoughts.

⁵¹ Esherick, “1911: A Review.”; Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Gasster, “The republican revolutionary movement.”; Tamura, et al., *China*.

⁵² Shao Dan, *Remote Homeland, Recovered Borderland* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011); Zhao, “Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century,” 3-30. It had two forms, one being “greater Chinese nationalism and the other “Han nationalism”. The former referred to China as a multiethnic entity in which the Manchu ethnic group is also included that legitimized the Manchu leadership’s rule over the country. This “interpretation was embraced by Han literati and officially disseminated through the educational system”. The latter promoted anti-Manchu sentiment in order to strip the government off from its legitimacy. Such nationalism was championed mainly by the revolutionaries who wished to establish a republic. However, later on Sun Yat-sen the main figure of the revolutionaries also adopted the broader concept of “greater Chinese nationalism”.

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- ⁵³ Esherick, "1911: A Review," 141.
- ⁵⁴ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 249.
- ⁵⁵ Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement." The revolutionaries in themselves incorporated several groups, many secret societies besides the Tongmenghui.
- ⁵⁶ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement.,"; Tamura, et al., *China*.
- ⁵⁷ De Bary and Lufrano, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*; Tamura, et al., *China*.
- ⁵⁸ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 243.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Esherick, "1911: A Review,,"; Wakeman, "Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History."
- ⁶¹ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 238-244. The urban elite also played a role in the early industrialization of the country since many invested in industrial enterprises.
- ⁶² Esherick, "1911: A Review,,"; Fairbank and Goldman, *China*; Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement.,"; Wakeman, "Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History."
- ⁶³ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 244. Besides the First Sino-Japanese war "when Japan's constitutional monarchy defeated Russia's tsarist autocracy in 1905, constitutionalism seemed to have proved its efficacy [again] as a basis for unity between rulers and ruled in a national effort. Even Russia...moved in 1905 toward parliamentary government".
- ⁶⁴ Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement," 510.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid, 512.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid, 508.
- ⁶⁷ Esherick, "1911: A Review," 141.
- ⁶⁸ Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement." Many revolutionaries were studying at military academies in Japan where they were introduced to Chinese revolutionary thought by the Japanese branch of the Tongmenghui.
- ⁶⁹ Tamura, et al., *China*.
- ⁷⁰ Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement," 515.
- ⁷¹ Ibid, 516.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Tamura, et al., *China*.
- ⁷⁴ Gasster, "The republican revolutionary movement," 531. The foreign powers, especially Great Britain had largely affected the negotiations between Yuan and the revolutionaries. "It quickly became evident to all that Britain's role would be decisive, and the British chose to sail cautiously with the tide. They respected Yuan and were pleased to see him return to office, but they were also impressed with the wide support that the revolution had so quickly attracted. They preferred a constitutional monarchy under nominal Manchu control, but they were not prepared to intervene to promote it. Meanwhile the anti-Ch'ing forces controlled precisely those parts of China where British interests lay. Although the British did not intervene directly, it is clear that if they helped anyone, even unintentionally, it was the revolutionaries".

⁷⁵ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 250.

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